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Abstract:  
 
A growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship addresses the issue of global constitutionalism. 
Scholarly contributions analyse the allocation of power within rule-systems of international law, how 
it affects subsequent international practice and its connection with political institutions. This article 
questions the validity of the use of constitutional concepts as a means for interpreting international 
law. An argument is made that current contributions on international constitutionalism are grounded 
on unstated assumptions. It is maintained that in order to restore coherence and unity within the 
international legal system, interpretations of international law should be carried out through 
interpretive means that are specifically conceived for international law. This article shows that 
although constitutionalism may be featured as an autonomous concept of international law, it is not 
able to restore coherence and unity within the international legal system. Therefore, it cannot be 
regarded as a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely recognised that international law is becoming increasingly fragmented into 
various fields governed by own principles and rules. Known as the phenomenon of 
fragmentation, such a functional specialization is generally regarded as a characteristic of 
modern international law. From international legal perspective, there are two main 
methodological approaches to fragmentation. The first one is represented by the Report on 
Fragmentation of the International Law Commission (ILC) of 2006.1 It establishes a set of 
basic guidelines on normative conflicts and is entirely based on provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969.2 The second one is represented by the 
idea of constitutionalisation of international law. This is a theoretical approach and refers to 
the process of constitutionalisation of both the entire international legal system and 
functional regimes of international law. 
 
Existent approaches to fragmentation aim at restoring coherence and unity within 
international law. Although there is no universally accepted definition of either 
fragmentation or international law,3 proponents of the constitutionalisation of international 
law assume that fragmentation is a characteristic of modern international law. However, the 
main problem associated with the idea of constitutionalisation is that, in light of the 
uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon of fragmentation, the ultimate purpose of 
scholarly contributions on constitutionalisation becomes questionable. Such contributions 
fail to provide any terminological or theoretical justification for the use of constitutional 
language in international law. Equally they do not provide any definition of fragmentation, 
which is the problem they are trying to redress. An argument is therefore made that 
although the nature of contested concepts can be maintained in relation to any key concept 
in law in general, and international law in particular, conceptions of international 
constitutionalism turn out to be grounded on unstated assumptions.  
 
This article questions the validity of the use of constitutional concepts as a means for 
interpreting international law in general, and restoring coherence and unity within 
international law in particular. By pursuing a theoretical inquiry into the structural nature 
of international law, it aims to establish whether constitutional interpretations of 
international law are able to address concerns of coherence of conflicting provisions of 
international law and, therefore, represent a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
To that end, the analysis is articulated into two strands. On one hand, it provides an 
account of existent conceptions of global constitutionalism. For the purpose of this article, 
the inquiry is limited to conceptions of constitutionalism beyond the state and does address 
issues of comparative constitutional law. On the other hand, it shows that, in theory, 
constitutionalism may be conceived as an autonomous concept of international law rather 
than a concept derived by analogy from the domestic conception of constitutionalism. 
Hence, by featuring international constitutionalism as a methodological approach to 
fragmentation with own characteristics, the article contributes a framework for further 
advancing the theory of constitutionalism beyond the state.  
                                                          
1 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682. 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) (1969) 
8 ILM 679 (VCLT). 
3 Tai-Heng Cheng, ‘Making International Law without Knowing What It Is’ (2011) 10 Washington
University Global Studies L Rev 1. 
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This article is divided into two parts, followed by some final remarks. Section 2 
conceptualises the relationship between fragmentation and constitutionalisation of 
international law. It examines substantive issues underlying the idea of fragmentation and 
provides an account of existent remedies thereto. Section 3 examines issues of autonomy 
and originality of constitutionalism as a methodological approach to fragmentation. It 
explores the idea of constitutionalism as an autonomous concept of international law. 
 
2. FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
2.1 Conceptualising Fragmentation 
 
The idea of fragmentation of international law is generally regarded as a phenomenon 
associated with the globalization of international society, especially the economic side of 
globalization.4 Although there is no universally accepted definition, international legal 
scholars maintain that fragmentation consists of the development of highly specialised fields 
of international law. Accordingly, some acknowledge that fragmentation is a technical 
problem rooted on conceptual matters. Martineau, for instance, writes that ‘the possibility 
of a debate on fragmentation presupposes that people disagree on how the tension between 
unity and diversity [in international law] is and should be managed’.5 Others recognise that 
it is a technical problem stemming from procedural matters. Koskenniemi and Simma, for 
example, refer to fragmentation as the manifold act of transposition of technical expertise 
from the national to the international context.6 Finally, others identify fragmentation with 
the interaction between conflicting rules and institutional practices culminating in the 
erosion of general international law.7    
 
International legal scholars also argue that fragmentation is a characteristic of modern 
international law stemming from international practice.8 The MOX Plant case of 2006,9 for 
instance, is regarded as a prominent example of this phenomenon. The dispute concerned 
the construction of a nuclear power installation – the MOX plant – in Sellafield (United 
Kingdom) and involved three stages and three different jurisdictions.10  
 
In the first stage, following several rounds of correspondence between the United Kingdom 
and Ireland which failed to address Ireland’s concerns regarding the radioactive discharges 
                                                          
4 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th ed, CUP 2008) 66; Joel P Trachtman, The Economic Structure of 
International Law (Harvard University Press 2008) 196-207; Christian Leathley, ‘An Institutional Hierarchy to 
Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?’ (2007) 40 Intl L & 
Politics 259, 262-264. 
5 Anne-Charlotte Martineau, ‘The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law’ (2009) 
22(1) LJIL 1, 27.  
6 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 
Modern L Rev 1, 4; Bruno Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ 
(2009) 20 EJIL 265, 270. 
7 Sahib Singh, ‘The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics’ (2011) 24 LJIL 23, 24-25. 
8 Benvenisti and Downs, for instance, argue that fragmentation consists of ‘the increased proliferation of 
international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries’. Eyal 
Benvenisti and George W Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford L Rev 595, 596; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The Danger of Fragmentation or 
Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice’ (1998-99) 31 NYU J Intl 
L & Politics 791. 
9 Case C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635. 
10 For a background on the litigation see, among many, Robin Churchill and Joanne Scott, ‘The Mox Plant
Litigation: The First-Half Life’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 643. 
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of the MOX plant, Ireland instituted an international tribunal for violation of Article 9 of 
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR Convention).11 The OSPAR arbitral tribunal considered itself competent to take 
into consideration only the provisions of the OSPAR Convention.12 It held that the United 
Kingdom had not violated the duty to make available the relevant information to Ireland 
under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention.13  
 
In the second stage, Ireland claimed a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) of 198214 for contamination of its water by the operation of the MOX plant. It 
brought proceedings against the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 287 UNCLOS, 
requesting the suspension of the MOX plant activities or, at least, interim measures.15 The 
ITLOS took the view that, although competent, it would be necessary to determine whether 
itself or the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had definite jurisdiction to settle the dispute.16 
Thus, bearing in mind considerations of mutual respect and comity between the two judicial 
institutions, the ITLOS stayed the proceedings in order to avoid the risk of conflicting 
decisions.17 At the same time, the European Commission started an infringement procedure 
against Ireland18 for violation of Article 292 of the European Community (EC) Treaty19 and 
Article 193 of the Euratom Treaty.20  
 
In the third stage, the ECJ held that by establishing an arbitral tribunal for alleged 
violations of UNCLOS provisions by the United Kingdom, Ireland had violated EC law.21 
The ECJ recognised that both the EC and its members entered the UNCLOS as a mixed 
agreement,22 and established that since mixed agreements have the same status within EC 
                                                          
11 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (adopted 22 
September 1992, entered into force 25 March 1998) (1993) 32 ILM 1072(OSPAR Convention). For extensive 
analysis of the case, see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of 
the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v United Kingdom and Northern Ireland)’ (2003) 18 Intl J Marine and Coastal L 
541. 
12 Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland versus United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), final award, 2 July 2003, UN Reports of Iternational Arbitral 
Awards 2006, vol XXIII 59, paras 85 and 92, <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/59-
151.pdf> accessed 8 May 2013. 
13 ibid para 106. 
14 Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 21 
ILM 1261(UNCLOS). 
15 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) 
(request for provisional measures) (2003) 41 ILM 405. For a comment, see Chester Brown, ‘International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Provisional Measures before the ITLOS: The MOX Plant Case’ (2002) 17 J 
Intl Maritime and Coastal L 267. 
16 For a detailed comment on this issue, see Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The Ireland v United Kingdom (Mox Plant) 
Case: Applying the Doctrine of Treaty Parallelism’ (2003) 18 J Intl Maritime and Coastal L 13. 
17 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), The Mox Plant case (Ireland v United Kingdom) 
(suspension of proceedings on jurisdiction and merits, and request for further provisional measures) (2003) 42 
ILM 1187, especially para 29, 1191.   
18 Case C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (MOX plant case) [2006] ECR I-4635. On 
this issue, see Gao Jianjun, ‘Comments on Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland’ (2008) 7 Chinese J 
Intl L 417. 
19 Now art 344 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  [2010] 
OJ C 83/47(TFEU). 
20 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (adopted 25 March 1957, entered into force 1 
January 1958) 298 UNTS 167(Euratom Treaty). 
21 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (n 9).  
22 ibid para 61. 
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law as agreements concluded by the EC alone, they become integral part of EC law.23 
Hence, the ECJ concluded that it had exclusive jurisdiction under Article 292 EC Treaty24 
and found Ireland in breach of the duty to inform and consult the competent EC institutions 
prior to establishing the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal.25  
 
Koskenniemi and Lavranos argue that, from the limited perspective of concerns of 
fragmentation, in this case the ECJ’s decision avoided the fragmentation of EC law without 
taking into consideration other international provisions relevant to the dispute.26 It thus 
contributed to the perceived fragmentation of international law. 
 
Other case law shows that functional regimes of international law act like autonomous 
regimes. In Kadi and Al-Barakaat,27 for example, the ECJ held that implementation of 
provisions of a UN Security Council’s resolution by EU member states cannot violate 
certain basic human rights that are protected under EU law. It thus established the primacy 
of EU law over other norms of international law. Likewise, in the Beef Hormone case the 
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decided that the precautionary 
principle developed under international environmental law was not binding under the 
WTO covered treaties28 while in EC-Biotech the WTO panel held that some international 
treaties, such as the Biosafety Protocol, represent non binding informative law that could be 
taken into account in interpreting WTO agreements.29 
 
Although the phenomenon of fragmentation may arguably be regarded as either the 
precondition or the consequence of the emergence of functional regimes of international 
law,30 there is no agreement on which perspective is the correct one. Koskenniemi, for 
example, argues that, given the structural nature of autonomous regimes, the tendency of 
international courts and tribunals to interpret international law provisions from the 
perspective and within the limits of their own jurisdiction contributes to an uncertain 
process of development of international law: 
 
It is not only that the boxes have different rules. Even if they had the same rules, they would 
be applied differently because each box has a different objective and a different ethos, a 
different structural bias… whatever the rules.31 
 
Despite the fact that international lawyers resort to different techniques to try to overcome 
the phenomenon of fragmentation,32 there is no agreement on the relationship between 
                                                          
23 ibid para 69. On this issue, see Paul J Cardwell and Duncan French, ‘Who Decides? The RCJ’s Judgment in 
the MOX Plant Dispute’ (2007) 19 J Env L 121, 123-124. 
24 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (n 9), paras 63, 133 and 136. 
25 ibid para 184.  
26 Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Freedom of Member States to Bring Disputes Before Another Court or Tribunal: 
Ireland Condemned for Bringing the MOX Plant Dispute Before an Arbitral Tribunal. Grand Chamber 
Decision of 30 May 2006, Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland’ (2006) 2 Eur Constl L Rev 456, 465-466.  
27 Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of 
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351. 
28 WTO, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products–Report of the Panel (13 February 
1998) WT/DS26/AB/R [123]–[125].  
29 WTO, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products–Reports of the 
Panel (29 September 2006) WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 29 January 2000, entered into force 11 September 2003) 
(2000) 39 ILM (2000). 
30 See (n 5) and (n 6).  
31 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal 
Education’ (2007) 1 EJLS <http://www.ejls.eu/1/3UK.htm> accessed 14 January 2013 (emphasis original).  
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general rules and special rules of international law.33 This prevents the formulation of a 
universally accepted hierarchy of the sources of international law, which would be used as 
the international law of normative conflicts.34 Hence, fragmentation turns out to be a 
condition inherent to international law, that is to say, a phenomenon to be managed rather 
than a problem to be solved. 
 
2.2 Remedies to Fragmentation 
 
2.2 1 ILC Report on Fragmentation 
 
To restore unity in international law, scholars and practitioners rely upon two main 
approaches to fragmentation. The first one consists of the findings of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation. Conceived as a technical tool-box for the legal professional,35 it offers the 
most comprehensive approach to the idea of fragmentation of international law. Since the 
ILC Report on Fragmentation aims at addressing normative conflicts arising from the 
emergence of autonomous regimes of international law, provisions of the VCLT (1969) are 
regarded as the basis of a possible international law of conflicts. The second methodological 
approach to fragmentation is represented by scholarly contributions on the 
constitutionalisation of international law.36  
 
The ILC Report on Fragmentation establishes that normative conflicts may be approached 
from both the perspective of the subject-matter and the perspective of the number of 
subjects bound by the same rule(s) of international law. Each methodology is grounded on 
the assumption that there is no formal hierarchy governing the primary sources of 
international law, due to the decentralised nature of international law.37 However, in some 
cases the determination of the same subject-matter within which to locate the relationship 
between general and special law may not be obvious, as long as the distinction between 
general and special rules is not always clear.38 For instance, a treaty on maritime transport 
of chemicals relates to various fields of international law, including trade law, the law of the 
sea and maritime transport.39 Hence, as a matter of principle, the Report on Fragmentation 
recognises that no rule ‘is general or special in the abstract but in relation to some other 
rule’.40 For the condition of same-subject matter cannot be regarded as decisive in 
establishing whether or not there is a conflict of international rules, the Report on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
32 As discussed in sec 2.2 below. 
33 See text (n 37). 
34 Koskenniemi argues that ‘[t]he choice of the frame determine[s] the decision. But for determining the 
frame there is no meta-regime, directive or rule’. Koskenniemi (n 6) 6. 
35 Against the formalistic approach of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 1), see Maksymilian Del Mar, 
‘System Values and Understanding of Legal Language’ (2008) 21 LJIL 29 (arguing that the ILC’s formalistic 
approach to international law leads to a surface coherence of the system instead of bolstering its 
responsiveness to social problems); Singh (n 7) arguing against international law as a system and in favour of 
formal unity governed by a hierarchical conception of the sources of international law.  
36 See sec 2.2.2 below. 
37 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 1), paras 9, 14, 485 and 493. See also Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, 
‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 LJIL 553; Antonio Cassese, 
International Law (2nd ed, OUP 2005) 198-199. 
38 Like general rules, special rules must be generally defined, even when they apply to a few cases only. This 
marks the difference between a special rule and an order given to somebody. ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 
1), paras 111, 116. 
39 ibid para 21. 
40 ibid para 112. 
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Fragmentation establishes that logical reasoning needs to be complemented by legal 
reasoning.41  
 
For the purpose of the Report on Fragmentation, the process of legal reasoning comprises 
three steps.42 The first one consists of the initial assessment of what the applicable rules and 
principles to the case in point might be.43 This step aims to single out the regulatory 
purpose of a specific cluster of provisions. The second step consists in determining which 
particular rules apply to the selected case.44 To that end, the choice must be consistent with 
and justified in light of the regulatory purpose. The third step consists in formulating the 
conclusions of the legal argumentation. Its purpose is to establish the pertinent relationship 
between conflicting principles and rules.45 Such conclusions must comport with general 
international law, including the rules of the VCLT (1969), customary international law and 
general principles of law recognised by civilized nations.46 
 
The main strength of this model of legal reasoning is that it is simple and clear, and proves 
to be a valuable tool for practitioners and scholars alike. However, it is grounded on the 
premise that ‘no homogeneous, hierarchical meta-system is realistically available to do away 
with such problems [of fragmentation]’.47 It also recognises that logical reasoning alone is 
not able to solve normative conflicts, but needs to be complemented by legal reasoning.48 
Consequently, it acknowledges general principles and rules as interpretive guidelines on one 
hand, and provides that the pertinent relationship between the relevant rules must be 
established ‘in view of the need for consistency of the conclusion with the perceived 
purposes or functions of the legal system as a whole’ on the other hand.49  
 
Within this context, the systematic use of the provisions of the VCLT (1969) operates only 
once the regulatory purpose has been chosen. It follows that, although this model of legal 
argumentation may contribute to restore coherence in international law, it does not provide 
evidence of the legitimacy of the process of legal argumentation in itself. This in turn 
suggests that, since international norms are not organised around a formal hierarchy, the 
process of establishing the regulatory purpose through which interpret the correct 
relationship between the relevant clusters of rules turns out to be based on an arbitrary 
choice. 
 
The considerations above show that, given the structural nature of international law as a 
consensual system governed by a relative hierarchy of norms, clashes between international 
legal provisions turn out to be unavoidable. From this perspective, the model of legal 
reasoning set forth in the Report on Fragmentation is aimed at managing normative 
conflicts on a case-by-case basis rather than eliminating the perceived idea of fragmentation. 
Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
 
                                                          
41 ibid para 25. 
42 ibid para 36. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid.  
45 ibid.  
46 ibid para 492. 
47 ibid para 493. 
48 ibid para 21. 
49 ibid para 36. 
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2.2.2 Constitutionalisation of International Law 
 
2.2.2.1 Terminological Issues 
 
Current scholarship on international constitutionalism appears to divide into three schools, 
namely, the normative school, the functionalist school, and the pluralist school.50 The 
normative school is based on the assumption that domestic constitutionalism needs to be 
complemented by international institutions and practices. From this perspective, 
international constitutionalism represents a form of supplemental constitutionalism. The 
functionalist school evaluates the process of constitutionalisation of selected regimes of 
international law. It analyses the extent to which a centralised authority enables or restrains 
the production of international law. Finally, the pluralist school examines processes of 
constitutionalisation beyond the state and comprises several conceptions of transnational 
constitutionalism. 
 
Despite the fact that there is a growing body of scholarly literature on constitutionalism 
beyond the state, there exists no generally accepted definition of constitutionalism or 
constitutionalisation of international law.51 Some authors use the terms constitutionalism, 
the international constitution and constitutionalisation as synonyms. Stone Sweet, for 
instance, examines the meaning of both constitutionalism and the constitution, and 
concludes that ‘the constitutionalisation of the legal system is largely the product of how the 
tensions inherent in legal pluralism are resolved’.52 Others use them associated with 
different meanings.53 For instance, constitutionalism is generally regarded as a concept 
broader than that of constitutionalisation. Others avoid any definitional conundrum not to 
restrict the field within the boundaries of any arbitrary definition54 while others rely upon 
them as if they were concepts taken for granted.55  Besson, for example, examines the 
concepts of constitution and constitutionalism in light of the debate on constitutional 
pluralism. However, the analysis is entirely grounded on the idea of constitutionalisation of 
international law, the definition of which is not provided. Within this context, what exactly 
                                                          
50 Antje Wiener and others, ‘Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 
1 Global Constitutionalism 1.  
51 Garrett Wallace Brown, ‘The Constitutionalization of What?’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 201; Bardo 
Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in Ronald St J Macdonald and Douglas M 
Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism. Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Nijhoff 
2005) 837; Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ 
(1998) 36 Colum J Transnational L 529, 552ff. 
52 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes’ (2009) 16 Indiana J 
Global Legal Studies 644 (emphasis added). 
53 For example, Johnston refers to constitutionalism as a model of international utopianism whereas 
Fassbender endorses the vision of constitutionalism as a normative and institutional project. Douglas M 
Johnston, ‘World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law’ in Macdonald and Johnston (n 51) 27; 
Fassbender (n 51) 552.  
54 Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in 
Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009) 9; Christine EJ Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective 
(Nijhoff 2011). 
55 Samantha Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and Democracy’ in Dunoff 
and Trachtman (n 54) 381-407. See also Susan C Breau, ‘The Constitutionalization of the International Legal 
Order’ (2008) 21 LJIL 545; Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein,
The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 1. 
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constitutes the process of constitutionalisation of international law remains unclear.56 
Hence, the interpretive function of constitutionalism remains an unstated assumption. 
 
2.2.2.1 Theoretical Issues 
 
Although existent scholarly contributions rely upon the idea of constitutionalism as an 
instrument through which conceptualise issues of legitimacy of international institutions 
and practices, such as the systemic relationship between conflicting principles and rules of 
international law, its theoretical foundations remain largely undermined by the uncertainty 
surrounding the use of constitutional language in international law.  
 
Regarding this, the theoretical inquiry into the terminology associated with international 
constitutionalism has practical implications that are related to the purpose of international 
constitutionalism. Schwöbel, for example, proposes a classification of conceptions of 
international constitutionalism that is based on the purpose of such conceptions.57 It 
comprises four dimensions, which ‘reflect the primary focus of the contributors of public 
international law to the field of global constitutionalism’.58 
 
The first dimension is referred to as social constitutionalism. It recognises that the purpose 
of constitutionalism is to promote and protect the web of social relations that emerge under 
international law. Concerns about participation as a means of limiting power, accountability 
of all international actors and individual rights are central to this vision. For example, 
Teubner argues that constitutionalism is entirely disassociated from the state while Fischer-
Lescano maintains that global constitutionalism is a political process that goes beyond 
public international law and state sovereignty to include civil society.59 
 
The second dimension is referred to as institutional constitutionalism. It acknowledges that 
international constitutionalism is a network of constitutional levels traversing both the 
national and the international order. It deals with the institutionalization or limitation of 
power, especially in the form of accountability of decision-makers. Peters, for instance, 
argues that the constitutions of states do not form anymore a complete basic order. In 
particular, it is contended that the combined effects of the phenomenon of globalization and 
the related de-constitutionalisation of domestic law entail that national constitutions can no 
longer regulate the totality of governance, with the consequence that the relationship 
between national and international law turns out to be a network rather than a hierarchy of 
norms.60 
 
The third dimension is referred to as normative constitutionalism. It establishes that 
international law is governed by certain superior rules whose legitimacy lies in their moral 
value for society. For example, de Wet argues that the international constitutional order is 
composed of jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes, which represent the core of the 
international value system. Since international law is conceived as a system with strong 
                                                          
56 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in Macdonald and Johnston (n 51) 
837; Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter’ (n 51) 552; Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Constitutionalism and the 
Myth of Practical Reason: Kelsenian Responses to Methodological Problems’ (2010) 23 LJIL 725 (arguing 
that ‘[i]nternational constitutionalism is not a legal theory’).  
57 Schwöbel (n 54) 4; Christine EJ Schwöbel, ‘Situating the Debate on Global Constitutionalism’ (2010) 8 IJCL 
611.  
58 Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism (n 54) 13. 
59 ibid 17-18. 
60 ibid 22-23. 
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ethical underpinnings, emphasis is thus placed on human rights as the common value of 
international society.61 
  
The fourth dimension is referred to as analogical constitutionalism. It draws analogies 
between features of the national and the international constitutional order. The EU, in 
particular, is regarded as a model of constitutionalism beyond the state. Drawing from this 
assumption, scholars make analogies between EU law and international law. For example, 
Habermas and Petersmann consider the EU as a political and legal model of 
constitutionalism for international law, respectively. Likewise, Kumm suggests that in order 
to assess the degree of legitimacy of international law from a constitutional perspective, the 
international legal principle of sovereignty should be replaced with the EU legal principle of 
subsidiarity.62 From another perspective, Walker argues that the debate surrounding EU 
constitutionalism refers to the act of translation of constitutional concepts from the national 
to the international settings and is aimed at solving problems of responsible and legitimate 
self-government within the EU.63 
 
It follows from the preceding that global constitutionalism is not a comprehensive theory 
but a conglomeration of scholarly contributions addressing concerns related to the issue of 
legitimacy of international institutions and practices rather than normative conflict. As a 
result, the ultimate purpose of global constitutionalism as a remedy to fragmentation turns 
out to be another unstated assumption. 
 
2.2.2.3 Methodological Implications 
 
From international legal perspective, one of the weaknesses of international 
constitutionalism is that, considered as an interpretive instrument, it lacks the objectivity of 
a methodological approach. Therefore, it may be argued that if the purpose of constitutional 
interpretations of international law is to restore coherence and unity within international 
law, then the positional perspective of analysis remains unstated. Alternatively, there are as 
many positional perspectives as the number of scholars that entered the debate. This 
suggests that in order to restore coherence and unity within international law, 
interpretations of the international legal system should be carried out by using legal tools 
that are tailored to the characteristics of modern international law. Furthermore, to be 
original the selected methodology should not double the findings of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation.64 
 
It is however difficult to envisage a model of legal reasoning alternative to the findings of 
the ILC Report on Fragmentation that is able to restore the alleged unity of general 
international law. Indeed, it is widely accepted among the international community of 
scholars that international law is a system based on state consent whose ultimate purpose 
consists in facilitating inter-state relations, with a view to support the interest of each state. 
Thus, as a functional system, international law does not possess any overarching teleology 
or ultimate purpose of its own. Alternatively, there are as many purposes of international 
law as the number of state interests protected by clusters of international provisions, which 
end up legitimating the perception of the idea of fragmentation.  
                                                          
61 ibid 40-41. 
62 ibid 47-48. 
63 Neil Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in Joseph HH Weiler and 
Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003) 32. 
64 As discussed in sec 2.2.1.  
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Within this context, existent conceptions of global constitutionalism cannot be regarded as 
an original approach to fragmentation, since they aim at restoring coherence in 
international law without addressing normative conflicts. However, existent scholarly 
contributions do not cover the whole spectrum of conceptions of constitutionalism beyond 
the state. An argument is therefore made that a possible way to frame the debate on 
constitutionalism as a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation is to conceive 
constitutionalism as an autonomous concept of international law rather than a concept 
derived by analogy from the domestic conception of constitutionalism. 
 
The following section explores the idea of international constitutionalism as a 
methodological approach specifically devised for interpreting international law. It aims to 
show whether constitutionalism is able to address normative conflicts and, consequently, 
restore coherence within international law. 
 
3. CONSTITUTIONALISM AS AN AUTONOMOUS CONCEPT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Despite terminological and theoretical differences characterising the debate on post-national 
constitutional settings, a shared characteristic of all conceptions of international 
constitutionalism is that they are conceived as interpretive instruments of international law. 
However, international law is a contested concept65 and scholars refer to it according to 
their understanding of the idea of legal system. For instance, some argue that international 
law is not even law66 while others write that it is a conglomeration of rules instead of a 
system.67 Others also maintain that it is a social system68 rather than a legal system.69  
 
Beyond the differences surrounding substantive arguments about the nature of international 
law, a common feature of all such conceptions is that they ultimately understand the 
international order as the product of the interaction between certain rules and certain 
subjects. However, questions such as who the subjects of international law are or what the 
ultimate sources of international law are remain without a universally accepted answer, 
although they have practical relevance. Likewise, it is not clear whether the ultimate 
purpose of international law is to facilitate inter-state relations70 or to establish an 
autonomous system that prevails over state will and national interests.71 Within this 
context, the issue of international personality, including its relation with the sources of 
international law, turns out to be the cornerstone of any theory of international law, since 
the notion of personality is used to distinguish between those actors that international law 
takes into account and those that are excluded from it.  
 
                                                          
65 Cheng (n 3). 
66 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfrid E Rumble ed, CUP 1995) 117-26. 
67 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1961) 208-231. 
68 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan J Intl L 999 (arguing that international law is a system 
grounded on social relations). 
69 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1994).  
70 See, for instance, Eric A Posner, ‘International Law: A Welfarist Approach’ (2006) 73 U of Chicago L Rev 
487. 
71 In relation to the international human rights treaty regime, see Eric A Posner, ‘Human Welfare, Not 
Human Rights’ (2008) 108 Columbia L Rev 1758. 
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Regarding this, it is widely accepted that the definition of international personality is the 
one articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Reparation Opinion of 1949: 
 
[A]n international person is... capable of... possessing international rights and duties, and 
has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.72  
 
However, this definition does not say which entities are international persons, nor does it 
state the criteria according to which international personality is attributed. An argument is 
therefore made that, from a logical point of view, it is possible to single out as many 
definitions of international personality as the number of conceptions of international law. It 
is further contended that resort to the findings of the most recent scholarship on 
international legal personality turns out to be helpful in order to examine the structural 
nature of international law in light of concerns of fragmentation and constitutionalisation.  
 
According to Portmann, there are three main conceptions of modern international law – 
namely, the formal conception, the individualistic conception and the actor conception.73 By 
implication, conceptions of international constitutionalism may be grounded on each of the 
three above mentioned conceptions of modern international law. As a thought-experiment, 
this section attempts to feature constitutionalism as an autonomous concept of international 
law. Its purpose is to establish the extent to which, if any, such conceptions of 
constitutionalism are able to address concerns of fragmentation of international law and 
whether they double the findings of the ILC Report on Fragmentation or possess 
conceptual autonomy. 
 
In order to avoid the terminological and theoretical concerns related to the idea of 
constitutionalisation of international law,74 the analysis of models of international 
constitutionalism is based on a conception of constitutionalism beyond the state that applies, 
in turn, to each of the three conceptions of modern international law. Such conception 
establishes that ‘constitutionalism provides the ideological context within which 
constitutions emerge and constitutionalisation functions’.75 
 
Although a seminal idea, this procedural conception of constitutionalism comprises three 
elements. First, constitutionalism is regarded as the idealistic component beyond the 
process of constitutionalisation. For the purpose of this article, such idealistic component is 
represented by each of the three conceptions of modern international law. Second, 
constitutionalisation is conceived as the process of implementation of the idealistic 
components of constitutionalism.76 Third, a constitution is regarded as the outcome of the 
process of constitutionalisation. 
                                                          
72 Reparation for Injuries in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 1949 < http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/4/1835.pdf > accessed 19 April 2013 [179]. 
73 Portmann’s analysis is the most comprehensive contribution to the issue of international personality from a 
normative point of view. Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (CUP 2010). For an 
historical perspective, see Janne E Nijman, The Concept of Legal Personality: an Inquiry into the History and Theory 
of International Law (TMC Asser Press 2004). For a selection of essays, see Fleur Johns, International Legal 
Personality (Ashgate 2010).  
74 See sec 2.2.2.1 above. 
75 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Introduction – Constitutionalism: A Theoretical Roadmap’ in Nicholas Tsagourias 
(ed), Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives (CUP 2007) 1. Likewise, Walker 
describes constitutionalism as ‘a multidimensional form of practical reasoning,’ that is to say, ‘a framing 
mechanism’. Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 525. 
76 In this context, constitutionalisation is understood as ‘a constitution-hardening process’. See Tsagourias (n 
75). 
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3.1 Formal Conception 
 
3.1.1 Constitutionalism 
 
3.1.1.1 Basic Propositions 
 
According to the procedural structure of international constitutionalism,77 the basic 
propositions of the formal conception of international law may be used as the idealistic 
component beyond the process of constitutionalisation of international law. The latter, in 
turn, represents the methodology through which interpret rule systems of international law.  
 
Regarded as the dominant conception of international law,78 the formal conception has two 
main propositions. The first one acknowledges that the personal scope of international law 
is an open concept and establishes that international actors are the addressees of the norms 
of international law. It thus recognises that the status of international personality is a 
byproduct of the international law-making process. The second one establishes that there 
are no further consequences attached to international legal personality. Its main 
manifestations in legal practice are the LaGrand79 and Avena80 cases before the ICJ and the 
AMCO v Indonesia case81 before the International Centre for Settlement of International 
Disputes (ICSID).  
 
Considered ‘a merely descriptive device belonging to the realm of legal doctrine and as such 
being without concrete legal implications’,82 this conception of international law provides 
that international legal personality does not confer the competence to create international 
law on international actors. In particular, it acknowledges that the capacity of international 
law creation stems from customary international law, which contains rules declaring that 
states are competent to create law by concluding international treaties.83 This creates a 
                                                          
77 Tsagourias (n 75).  
78 Portmann (n 73) 248. 
79 The ICJ held that, according to general principles of treaty interpretation, art 36(1) (b) of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (1963) directly applies to individuals. According to the ICJ, direct effect of 
treaty provisions granting rights on individuals is an issue concerning treaty interpretation. There is no 
presumption or consequence associated with the concept of legal personality of the individual. LaGrand Case 
(Germany v. United States) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466.    
80 The ICJ reaffirmed its interpretation of art 36(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) 
as articulated in LaGrand. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) [2004] 
ICJ Rep 12.   
81 In Amco v Indonesia the arbitral tribunal held that, in the absence of any specific clause in the contracts 
entered by Amco and the state-owned Indonesian company, international law applies, directly and fully, to 
those contracts. By interpreting art 42(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention, 1965) without any restriction, the arbitral 
tribunal stated that international law prevails over national law. Consequently, it granted compensation to 
Amco without relying on the issue of international personality. This shows that, although in principle 
companies may be considered international persons, there are neither presumptions nor consequences 
associated with such recognition. Amco Asia Corporation and Others v. The Republic of Indonesia, Resubmitted 
Case: Award on Merits (31 May 1990), reported in [1992] ILR 580.  
82 Portmann (n 73) 174.  
83 Kelsen writes that international law is a system of norms created by customs. As long as the state is 
regarded as an organ of international law, a legal rule created by international custom also obligates states 
which did not participate to its creation. Drawing from this assumption, Kelsen concludes that ‘[l]aw 
regulates its own action. So does international law’. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State 
(Russell&Russell 1961) 351–354, 354. See also Portmann (n 73) 176-177; Jochen von Bernstorff and Thomas 
Dunlap, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in Universal Law (CUP 2010) 165-178; 
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hierarchy of norms authorising specific international actors to create and apply 
international law.  
 
3.1.1.2 Purpose of Constitutionalism 
 
Any model of international constitutionalism aims to provide interpretations of 
international law in light of the structural nature of the system, as established by the 
underlying conception of international law adopted. Accordingly, the purpose of 
international constitutionalism comports with the purpose of the selected conception of 
international law. In the case of the formal conception of international law, its basic 
propositions do not clarify what the ultimate purpose (or teleology) of international law is. 
Instead, they establish that the subjects of international law are the recipients of the norms 
of international law and that the ultimate sources of international law consist of treaties and 
international customary law. 
 
Since the concept of personality is used to distinguish between those actors that 
international law takes into account and those that are excluded from it, recourse to it has 
practical implications. With regard to the concept of subjects of international law, the first 
basic proposition of the formal conception of international law endorses the definition of 
international legal personality articulated by the ICJ in the Reparation opinion of 1949.84 
Although this definition does not say which entities are international persons, nor does it 
state the criteria according to which international personality is attributed, it does say that 
international actors have rights and duties and, accordingly, can act in a legally relevant 
way. Viewed from this angle, international actors are the recipients of the norms of 
international law. 
 
With regard to the ultimate sources of international law, the first basic proposition complies 
with the provision of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, according to which the sources 
of international law comprise treaties and customs.85 This suggests that states are regarded 
as the primary subjects of international law. 
 
However, to say that international law is a state-centered system implies a circular 
definition of international law: states are the primary actors of international law, that is to 
say, the recipients of the norms of international law, but they create the norms of 
international law themselves. From this perspective, the ultimate purpose of international 
law turns out to be what states have chosen to regulate for their mutual benefit and, 
consequently, to be bound by. While such regulations may address both state and non-state 
actors, the issue of the binding force of international law provisions becomes independent of 
state will by means of tacit agreement and creates a supra-national system of rules. It 
follows that there are as many purposes of international law as the number of interests 
covered by regulation and such purposes stay on an equal footing of importance. Hence, 
international law cannot be regarded as a homogeneous system of rules. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Francois Rigaux, ‘Hans Kelsen on International law’ (1998) 9 EJIL 325; Charles Leben, ‘Hans Kelsen and the 
Advancement of International Law’ (1998) 9 EJIL 287; WB Stern, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of International Law’ 
(1936) 30 American Political Science Rev 736. 
84 See (n 72). 
85 Art 38(1) ICJ Statute also refers to general principles of law recognised by civilised nations and the 
decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of all nations. Statute of the International Court
of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Annex I (ICJ Statute). 
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In this context, the purpose of international constitutionalism consists in preserving the 
heterogeneous nature of international law. This implies that as long as it is conceived as an 
interpretive instrument, constitutionalism relies upon a model of legal reasoning that by 
necessity duplicates the one set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation, even though the 
relative nature of such model of legal reasoning does not entail that provisions of the VCLT 
(1969) represent the sole positional perspective of analysis. 
 
3.1.2 Constitutionalisation  
 
The second element of the procedural definition of international constitutionalism is 
constitutionalisation.86 Dunoff and Trachtman write that a functional approach to the 
constitutionalisation of international law provides insights into the purposes that 
international constitutional norms are intended to serve.87 They argue that 
constitutionalisation is a process88 and propose a functionalist methodology that is based on 
the constitutional matrix of international law.89  
 
Regarded as an analytical device,90 the constitutional matrix aims to rationalise the 
allocation of powers within the legal order of both international organisations and the 
international law system as a whole. Dunoff and Trachtman argue that:  
 
[A] functional approach permits conceptual analysis that is not premised upon a definition 
setting forth a group of necessary and sufficient conditions which determine whether a given 
order is constitutional or not. … [C]onstitutionalism consists of a type – rather than a 
quantum – of rules.91 
 
Such a functional approach is grounded on the presumption that ‘the distinguishing feature 
of international constitutionalization is the extent to which international law-making 
authority is granted (or denied) to a centralized authority’.92 Accordingly, the purpose of the 
constitutional matrix is to establish the extent to which a centralised authority enables or 
restrains the production of international law. To that end, it possesses a normative structure 
comprising seven mechanisms93 whose function is to implement three basic constitutional 
functions.94 Such functions serve the purpose of enabling the formation of international law, 
constraining the formation of international law and supplementing deficiencies of domestic 
constitutional law caused by the phenomenon of globalization.95 
 
The constitutional matrix complies with the two basic propositions of the formal conception 
of international law and it has been used to assess the process of constitutionalisation of five 
selected regimes of international law – namely, the international legal system, international 
human rights law, UN law, EU law and WTO law.96 However, Dunoff and Trachtman 
                                                          
86 Tsagourias (n 75).  
87 Dunoff and Trachtman (n 54) 10. 
88 ibid 18. 
89 ibid 26.  
90 ibid 26-30. 
91 ibid 9. 
92 ibid 4. 
93 They are horizontal allocation of powers, vertical allocation of power, supremacy, stability, fundamental 
rights, review and accountability/democracy. ibid 27-29.  
94 They are referred to as enabling constitutionalisation, constraining constitutionalisation and supplemental 
constitutionalisation. ibid 10.  
95 ibid. 
96 ibid 27-29. 
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argue that the constitutional matrix aims ‘to allow to compare the constitutional 
development of different regimes, but it does not allow to identify strengths and weaknesses 
in various regimes’.97 As a result, the functional approach to constitutionalisation embedded 
in the constitutional matrix provides a map of the law-making centres of international 
regimes. 
 
3.1.3 Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation 
 
In order to determine whether the formal conception of international constitutionalism is a 
methodological approach endowed with conceptual autonomy or it relies upon the same 
model of legal reasoning set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation, this sub-section 
draws a comparison between the two models of legal reasoning. 
 
The constitutional matrix entails a functional approach to international law. Viewed from 
this angle, the rule-system of international law under scrutiny may be regarded as the 
equivalent of the regulatory purpose of analysis, as set forth in the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation. Compliance with the other two steps of the ILC’s model of legal reasoning 
follows as a logical consequence. This shows that the constitutional matrix lacks originality 
with regard to the methodology proposed. There are nonetheless significant differences 
between the two models of legal reasoning.  
 
In particular, while the ILC Report on Fragmentation recognises provisions of the VCLT 
(1969) as the nascent international law of conflict, the constitutional matrix establishes a 
hierarchy of the norms of international law consisting of the constitutional norms of the 
regime of international law under scrutiny. This shows that the ultimate purpose of the 
process of constitutionalisation through the constitutional matrix turns out to be an 
assessment of internal efficiency of the selected regimes of international law. Consequently, 
the constitutionalisation of international law turns out to be aimed at strengthening the 
emergence of autonomous regimes of international law, thus contributing to normative 
conflict and the erosion of general international law.  
 
3.2 Individualistic Conception 
 
3.2.1 Constitutionalism 
 
Following the pattern of analysis adopted in relation to the formal conception of 
international constitutionalism, the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of 
international law may be regarded as the idealistic component beyond the process of 
constitutionalisation of international law. Such a conception of international 
constitutionalism may thus be referred to as the individualistic conception of international 
constitutionalism. 
 
3.2.1.1 Basic Propositions 
 
The individualistic conception of international law is currently regarded as a conception 
that is functional to the field of human rights law. It draws on the teachings of 
Lauterpacht98 and it has two basic propositions. The first proposition establishes that states 
are entities created by individuals for individuals. In principle, this entails that there is no 
                                                          
97 ibid 30. 
98 Portmann (n 73) 126-172.   
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difference between the interest of the state and the interest of individuals, so long as the 
latter are regarded as the beneficiaries of all law, including international law. Regarding 
this, Lauterpacht writes that: 
 
No doubt it is true to say that international law is made for States, and not States for 
international law, but it is true only in the sense that the State is made for human beings, 
and not human beings for the State.99 
 
From this standpoint, international law creates basic rights and duties of the individual, in 
addition to rights and duties of states, state actors and non-state actors. 
 
The second basic proposition maintains that, in addition to treaties and customs, the sources 
of international law include general principles of law, which are independent of state will. 
This entails a qualified presumption in favour of the international legal personality of the 
individual, which is not derived from state will. Its main manifestations in legal practice are 
the Nuremberg trials,100 the US Alien Tort Claims Act case law101 and the case law on the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).102 
 
3.2.1.2 Purpose of Constitutionalism 
 
The basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law show that, as a 
conception functional to the field of human rights, it pursues a teleological and normative 
approach to international law. Hence, the conception of international constitutionalism 
grounded on the individualistic conception of international law recognises that the ultimate 
beneficiary of the international legal system is the world community of individuals.103 It 
then assesses the legitimacy and coherence of international law against this assumption. 
Viewed from this angle, the individualistic conception turns out to be an interpretive, non-
binding device. 
 
By establishing that the primary normative unit is the individual rather than the State,104 
the individualistic conception of international law recognises that the boundaries of 
                                                          
99 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Clarendon Press 1933) 430-31. 
100 In the judgment of 1 October 1946, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg sentenced to 
death twelve Nazi defendants. It held them individually responsible for committing the crime of war 
aggression under international law. The IMT held that Germany was a party of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928 prohibiting the use of war as an instrument of national policy. Subsequently, it established that 
aggressive war was not only illegal under international law, but that it should be treated as an international 
crime. It derived this status from general principles of justice instead of the provisions of the treaty itself. It 
then established the presumption that the international crime of aggression entails international responsibility 
of individuals and not of states. In re Goering and Others, Judgement of the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 220-221.       
101 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC §1350. The Alien Tort Act is a civil procedure enacted in 1789 that allows 
non-US citizens to bring a tort action in US courts ‘for violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States’. In the Kadic v. Karadzic II judgment of 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed that private entities can 
violate international norms of jus cogens. It held that jus cogens norms equally apply to individuals acting on 
behalf of the state or of a non-state entity, therefore they cannot be judged by different standards. Kadic v. 
Karadzic II (US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1995) (Chief Judge Newman), (1997) 104 ILR 149.    
102 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention of 
Human Rights, as amended) ETS No. 5; 213 UNTS 221. In Loizidou v. Turkey, for example, the ECtHR 
affirmed that the ECHR ‘is an instrument for the protection of individual human beings’. Loizidou v Turkey I, 
(1995) Series A No 310, para 75. 
103 Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein (n 55) 
155. 
104 cf Fernando R Tesón, ‘The Kantian Theory of International Law’ (1992) 92 Columbia L Rev 53, 54. 
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international law are not limited to horizontal relationships between sovereign states. 
Likewise, certain scholarship maintains that international law is entirely based on an 
individualized view of sovereignty105 where the principles of equality and human dignity 
constitute the pillars of the international legal system.106 This suggests that the teleological 
perspective embodied in the individualistic conception of international law extends far 
beyond international human rights law. 
 
3.2.2 Constitutionalisation 
 
According to the procedural definition of constitutionalism,107 constitutionalisation is the 
process of implementation of the normative components of constitutionalism. In this case, it 
represents the methodology used to interpret clusters of international provisions in light of 
the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law. As long as the 
individualistic conception of international law is a teleological conception, an argument is 
made that a possible constitutional matrix grounded on its two basic propositions should be 
based on the twin concepts of human dignity and human rights. From this perspective, 
implementation of the normative components of constitutionalism turns out to be based on 
a human rights constraint, which, in turn, entails the idea of rule of law. 
 
Within the individualistic conception of international constitutionalism, the process of 
operationalization of the rule of law possesses four normative features. The first feature 
acknowledges that individuals are decision-makers. This characteristic stems from the 
presumption in favour of the personality of international law of the natural person.108 A 
similar argument is put forward by Peters, who argues that the natural person is ‘the 
ultimate unit of legal concern’109 and partakes in the process of creation of international 
norms by virtue of her participatory rights.110 
 
The second feature establishes that the rule of law is a means for the empowerment of 
individuals. It stems from the assumption that the individual possesses rights and 
obligations under international law, irrespective of nationality concerns111 and entails that 
the function of the rule of law consists in creating the conditions for the fulfilment of the 
individual’s needs, both as a single and in society. The UN Secretary-General, for example, 
writes that the rule of law is a powerful tool for the empowerment of individuals and civil 
society.112 
 
The third feature recognises the value-oriented character of the process of implementation 
of the rule of law. It is derived from the normative concept of human dignity. The UN 
Secretary-General, for example, stresses that engagement in the rule of law assistance rests 
                                                          
105 Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and O of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 EJIL 513, 515ff. Against Peters’s 
position, see Emilie Kidd White, Catherine E Sweetser, Emma Dunlop and Amrita Kapur, ‘Humanity as the A 
and O of Sovereignty: Four Replies to Anne Peters’ (2009) 20 EJIL 545. See also Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as 
the A and O of Sovereignty: A Rejoinder to Emily Kidd White, Catherine E. Sweetser, Emma Dunlop and 
Amrita Kapur’ (2009) 20 EJIL 569. 
106 Peters, Humanity as the A and O (n 105) 515 ff.  
107 Tsagourias (n 75). 
108 As established by the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law. 
109 Anne Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community (n 103) 155. 
110 ibid 160. Peters also writes that ‘the individual capacity to claim [before an international tribunal] is a 
limited functional equivalent to the law-making power of states’. ibid 161. 
111 ibid 174. 
112 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Annual Report on Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule 
of Law Activities’ (2009) UN Doc A/64/298, paras 42-45. 
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upon the ‘need to evaluate the impact of [its] programming on the lives of the peoples the 
Organization serves’.113 This entails that the operationalization of the rule of law requires 
the constant participation of local communities in the various decision-making and 
verification processes. 
 
The fourth feature acknowledges that the rule of law as a mere concept is not enough.114 
For instance, Ringers writes that to become operational, the idea of the rule of law should 
be accompanied by a structured procedure.115 In context of the individualistic conception of 
constitutionalism, this process of operationalization of the rule of law fosters a bottom-up 
perspective116 while recognising the existence of several decision-making levels, including 
the individual.  
 
The observations above suggest that a possible constitutional matrix may be represented by 
the normative structure of the right to development, as set forth in the UN Declaration on 
the Right to Development of 1986.117 There are three reasons supporting this view. First, 
solemnly proclaimed as a human right in itself, the Declaration on the Right to 
Development comprises all other human rights. It is therefore regarded as a particular 
vector of human rights.118 Second, it is a procedural right. The UN Independent Expert on 
the Right to Development, for instance, suggests that one way to implement the right to 
development consists in adopting development compacts. The latter require specific 
negotiations on a case-by-case basis.119 Such negotiations must ensure the prioritization of 
certain basic commitments,120 popular participation121 and the accountability of the actors 
                                                          
113 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law’ (2008) UN 
Doc A/63/226, para 64 (emphasis added). 
114 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights 
for All’ (2005) UN Doc A/59/2005, para 133. 
115 Thom Ringer, ‘Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common 
Understanding of the “Rule of Law” and its Place in Development Theory and Practice’ (2007) 10 Yale Human 
Rights & Development L J 186. 
116 ‘[S]tates should not be conceived as the ‘primary’ subjects of international law’. Peters (n 103) 179. See also 
Janet K Levit, ‘Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of International 
Law’ (2007) 32 Yale J Intl L 395. In favour of a state-centered conception of international law, see Jack L 
Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP 2005). 
117 UNGA Res 41/128 (4 December 1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/128. For a historical and normative account, 
see Isabella D Bunn, The Right to Development and International Economic Law: Legal and Moral Dimensions 
(Hart 2012); Richard N Kiwanuka, ‘Developing Rights: The UN Declaration on the Right to Development’ 
(1988) 35 NILR 257. On the legal rationale behind the right to development, see Stephen P Marks, 
‘Obligations to Implement the Right to Development: Philosophical, Political and Legal Rationales’ in Bård A 
Andreassen and Stephen P Marks (eds), Development as a Human Right: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions 
(2nd ed, Intersentia 2010) 73, 90-98. On the issue of justiciability of the right to development, see Amartya Sen, 
‘Human rights and Development’ in Andreassen and Marks (eds), ibid 3, 8-9; Martin Scheinin, ‘Advocating the 
Right to Development through Complaint Procedures under Human Rights treaties’ in Andreassen and Marks 
(eds), ibid, 339ff. 
118 Arjun Sengupta, ‘The Human Right to Development’ (2004) 32 Oxford Development Studies 183, 191 
(arguing that the right to development represents a right to a process of development or a meta-right).  
119 UNHCHR ‘First Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Dr. Arjun 
Sengupta’ (27 July 1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2, para 34. Arjun Sengupta, ‘On the Theory and 
Practice of the Right to Development’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 837, 880-83.  
120 Priority should be accorded to the protection of the worst-off, the poorest and the most vulnerable. See UN 
Independent Expert on the Right to Development (n 119), paras 32 and 69–76.  
121 A passage from the Global Consultation report reads: ‘participation is the right through which all other 
rights in the Declaration on the Right to Development are exercised and protected’. Report of the Secretary-
General ‘Global Consultation on the Right to Development as a Human Right’ (1990) UN Doc
E/CN.4/1990/9/Rev.1, para 177. 
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involved.122 Third, the process of operationalization of the right to development through 
development compacts turns out to be consistent with the bottom-up conception of the rule 
of law. Implementation of a global compact would thus represent a constitutional outcome, 
according to the procedural definition of constitutionalism. 
 
3.2.3 Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation 
 
The findings of the analysis carried out in the previous sub-section shows that as long as 
the ultimate purpose of the individualistic conception of constitutionalism does not consist 
in solving normative conflicts, fragmentation is not a component of the process of 
constitutionalisation. This suggests that the individualistic conception of constitutionalism 
does not aim at restoring coherence within the international legal system. Hence, it cannot 
be regarded as a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation of positive international law. 
 
As noted above in relation to the formal conception of international constitutionalism, the 
process of constitutionalisation of selected regimes of international law entails a functional 
approach to international law. Likewise, the process of constitutionalisation implementing 
the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law entails a 
teleological, that is to say functional, approach to international law. This further 
strengthens the conclusion that the teleological matrix does not represent a remedy to the 
phenomenon of fragmentation of positive international law. 
 
However, the main difference between the two constitutional matrices is that they do not 
rely upon the same model of legal reasoning. Consequently, as the constitutional matrix 
implementing the tenets of the individualistic conception of constitutionalism does not 
double the findings of the ILC Report on Fragmentation, it turns out to be an interpretive 
instrument of international law endowed with conceptual autonomy. 
 
3.3 Actor Conception 
 
The actor conception is currently regarded as the minoritarian conception of international 
law. It proposes a policy-oriented approach to international law and draws on the teachings 
of the scholars of the New Haven school of international law.123 It has two basic 
propositions. The first proposition establishes that international law is not a set of rules but 
a process of authoritative decision-making. The second proposition maintains that 
participation in the decision-making process is open to all those state and non-state actors 
that have authoritative power. Its main manifestations in legal practice are the Reineccius et 
al v Bank for International Settlements case,124 the International Tin Council case125 and the 
Sandline v Papua New Guinea award.126  
                                                          
122 For example, the UN Independent Expert writes that ‘[the responsibility of states] is complementary to 
the individuals’ responsibility […] and is just for the creation of the conditions for realizing, not for actually 
realizing the right to development. Only the individuals themselves can do this’. UN Independent Expert on 
the Right to Development (n 119), para 41 (emphasis added). 
123 Portmann (n 73) 208-242. 
124 In its judgment of 2002, the Permanent Court of Arbitration declared the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) an international person. Created in 1930 by two international treaties, the BIS is chartered 
as a ‘Company by limited shares’ under Swiss law. Its shares are held by some of the contracting governments 
and private parties. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled on the legality of the BIS Board of Directors’ 
proposal to amend the BIS Statutes in order to recall all privately held shares against payment of 
compensation. The arbitral tribunal established that ‘the functions of the Bank were essentially public 
international in their character’. It held that the BIS was an international organisation and concluded that the 
applicable law was international law, not municipal law. It thus found that there was no violation of the BIS 
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Like the individualistic conception, this policy-oriented conception of international law is 
also a teleological conception of international law. Such a characteristic stems from a two-
fold consideration. First, the actor conception establishes the presumption that law is a 
means for creating a global public order of human dignity.127 A world order of human 
dignity is described as ‘one which approximates the optimum access by all human beings to 
all things they cherish: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect, 
and rectitude’.128 Second, like the individualistic conception of international law, it 
recognises that the natural person is the ultimate beneficiary of all law. Wiessner, for 
example, writes that ‘an ideal legal order should allow all individuals, and particularly the 
weakest among them, to realize themselves and accomplish their aspirations’.129  
 
However, the two conceptions of international law rely upon different methodological 
approaches. On one hand, the actor conception does not provide any definition of human 
dignity. It acknowledges that the process of law-making consists of a sequence of 
authoritative and controlling decisions.130 On the other hand, the individualistic conception 
of international law implies that commitment to individual empowerment is based on the 
idea of rule of law while the policy-oriented approach fostered by the actor conception does 
not acknowledge international law as a system of rules. This suggests that the actor 
conception of international law does not recognise the idea of constitutionalisation of 
international law altogether. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Constitutive Instruments. In addition, it established that under general international law on expropriation, the 
share recall was lawful. However, after further research into international case law on compensation for 
expropriation, it found that BIS owed full compensation to its former private shareholders. Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, Dr. Horst Reineccius, First Eagle SoGen Funds, Inc., Mr. Pierre Mathier and La Société de Concours 
Hippique de la Châtre, v. Bank for International Settlements, Partial Award on the Lawfulness of the Recall of the 
Privately Held Shares and the Applicable Standards for Valuation of those Shares, 8 January 2001, (2003) 15 
World Trade and Arbitration Materials 73.     
125 Recalling the conclusions of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries, the ECJ Advocate-General 
Darmon declared that the International Tin Council (ITC) possessed personality in international law, since it 
was an independent organ having its own decision-making power. Drawing from this assumption, the English 
Court of Appeal concluded that this precluded liability of member states for the debts of the organization, even 
in the absence of any international rule declaring such liability. Case C-241/87 Maclaine Watson & Company 
Limited v. Council and Commission of the European Communities [1990] ECR I-01797, Opinion of M Darmon, 
para 133; Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry; J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) v. 
Department of Trade and Industry and Others, England, Court of Appeal, 1988, (1989) 80 ILR 49, 108.  
126 The dispute arised from the interpretation of the agreement between Papua New Guinea and Sandline 
International Inc. establishing that Sandline would provide military and security services to Papua New 
Guinea against payment of a fee of 36 million US dollars, in two instalments. Following the refusal by Papua 
New Guinea to pay the second instalment, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal was constituted to settle the dispute. 
According to terms of the agreement, the parties chose English law as the applicable law. However, the 
arbitral tribunal held that, as a contract concluded by a state, public international law was the applicable law. 
It also pointed out that international law forms a part of English law. The arbitral tribunal thus established 
that a state cannot rely on its internal law for justifying the non-performance of an international obligation 
and concluded that the contractual obligation still existed and ordered Papua New Guinea to pay the second 
fee to Sandline. Sandline Inc. v. Papua New Guinea, Interim Award, 9 October 1998, (2000) 117 ILR 552, paras 
10-13.   
127 Siegfried Wiessner, ‘Law as a Means to a Public Order of Human Dignity: The Jurisprudence of Michael 
Reisman’ (2009) 34 Yale J Intl L 525, 528. Myres S McDougal, ‘Perspectives for an International Law of 
Human Dignity’ (1959) 53 American Society Intl L Proceedings 107. 
128 W Michael Reisman, Sigfried Wiessner and Andrew R Willard, ‘The New Haven School: A Brief 
Introduction’ (2007) 32 Yale J Intl L 575, 576. 
129 Wiessner (n 127) 531. 
130 Eisuke Suzuki, ‘The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented 
Jurisprudence’ (1974) 1 Yale Studies in World Public Order 1, 29. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The elusive challenge of restoring unity in international law has fascinated generations of 
scholars. The nascent literature on constitutionalism beyond the state is the last attempt to 
organize the body of international laws into a predictable, value-oriented system of rules. 
However, as a system created by state consent, international law proves to be a system 
crystallized on international practice rather than constrained by superior rules. Whether 
this makes the hunt for unity of the system an impossible task, the issue of coherence of 
existent international rules and principles represents the ultimate goal of existent 
methodological approaches to fragmentation, including global constitutionalism. 
 
Current conceptions of constitutionalism in international law conflate the idea of unity and 
coherence of the system. This results in a lack of terminological and theoretical consensus 
among scholars, which ultimately undermines the ultimate purpose of such conceptions. In 
particular, constitutional interpretations of international law attempt to tackle the perceived 
phenomenon of fragmentation of international law by creating hierarchies of extra-legal 
values – eg the Western conception of human dignity and human rights – and of rules such 
as jus cogens without addressing normative conflicts. 
 
This article examined the idea of global constitutionalism from international legal 
perspective. It showed that in the absence of any definition of either fragmentation or 
constitutionalism, the latter may be featured as an interpretive means endowed with 
conceptual autonomy under international law. Since international law is in turn regarded as 
a contested concept, the analysis established the presumption that conceptions of 
international constitutionalism may be grounded on each of the three conceptions of 
modern international law taken into consideration. 
 
The findings of the analysis show that resort to different conceptions of constitutionalism is 
not able to restore coherence and unity within international law. In particular, the inquiry 
reveals that the purpose of the formal conception of international constitutionalism is to 
address concerns of optimization of internal allocation of powers of functional regimes of 
international law whereas the purpose of the individualistic conception of constitutionalism 
is to evaluate whether a selected cluster of international provisions is able to protect a 
minimum core of human dignity through the process of implementation of human rights 
provisions. The findings of the analysis also show that as long as it implies a policy-oriented 
approach, there is no scope to feature constitutionalism from the perspective of the actor 
conception of international law. 
 
It follows from the preceding that it is difficult to envisage a model of legal reasoning that is 
able to restore the alleged unity of general international law. Indeed, it is widely accepted 
among the international community of scholars that, as a consensual and decentralised 
system, international law does not possess any overarching teleology or ultimate purpose of 
its own. Alternatively, there are as many purposes of international law as the number of 
state interests protected by clusters of international provisions, which end up legitimating 
the perception of the idea of fragmentation. This suggests that, perhaps, it is not possible to 
redress the phenomenon of fragmentation, either through the findings of the Report on 
Fragmentation or through the process of constitutionalisation. If this holds true, then the 
Report on Fragmentation ought to be regarded as a means for managing normative conflict 
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rather than a remedy to fragmentation while constitutional interpretations of international 
law eventually turn out to be an academic, though valuable, exercise in normative theory. 
 
